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Thank you for inviting me to this important conference: my field is Cultural Policy 
Studies, which is a way of researching and looking at culture primarily framed with 
policy — and I understand policy in terms of dynamic relations between law, 
institutions and organisational fields (such as the cultural sector, creative economy, 
or art worlds). I am not a lawyer but work with a lawyer as Co-editor in Chief of the 
Journal of Law, Social Justice and Global Development (which has its origins in 
Warwick Law School). You may download the special issue of 2018 [pictured], on 
Cultural Rights, which I edited (Vickery, 2018); the issue was started in 2018 while I 
was a visiting professor at the UNESCO Chair in Hildesheim, Germany, known for 
their Arts Rights Justice Academy — a port of call for anyone interested in 
downloading some more material pertinent to the subject of artistic freedom and 
human rights [see URL in the References below].  
 
If I may, I also refer you to the central text representing a cultural policy approach to 
human rights and artistic freedoms in The Wroclaw Commentaries (2016).1 In the 
written version of this paper, I (will) also include an appendix, where I have tabulated 
the relevant articles of the International Bill of Rights specific to artists and their 
freedoms [see Appendix].  
 
My first point human rights may be defined by clear objects of analysis — 
international treatises and their legal instruments, for example [and in relation to 
artistic freedom, Article 15 of the ICESCR] — but they function in a less defined, 
more complex, multi-dimensional way. Human rights as a body of knowledge is 
affected and effective only by the use of language and interpretation, narratives and 
communication, expressions and specific insights into human experience. That may 
seem an obvious, if not pedantic, point. For me, as a cultural researcher, it is 
significant. In her article, ‘How the Visual Arts Can Further the Cause of Human 
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Rights’, Catherine Craven tells how The South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission’s Human Rights Violations Committee (from 1996-1998), while 
admirable, could never quite identify and encompass the expanse of human 
experience that expressed profound human rights abuse (Craven, 2011: 4-6). This 
is, on the face of it, why art may have a role, not simply as expression or therapy, but 
in building what Stanford Law professor Lawrence Friedman calls a “human rights 
culture” (Friedman, 2011). I also refer you to UNESCO’s 2001 Universal Declaration 
on Cultural Diversity (UNESCO, 2001) where being human, in a way human rights 
law is conceptually emphatic, is most effectively articulated through culture. 
Declaration Article 5 indicates that the human rights work of culture is in creating an 
“enabling environment”. This is what I want to explore in this paper. 
 
To reiterate my last point: Human rights can be deceptively clear to lawyers, yet 
endlessly mutable to others. In Jack Donnelly’s phraseology, Human Rights involve 
a “relative Universality”: the universality of ‘the human’ cannot ground absolute 
rights-claims with a transparent and incontestable sense of legitimacy. Rather, 
human rights are always composed of “multiple defensible conceptions” and “many 
defensible implementations” (Donnelly, 2007: 299). There is something of human 
rights that requires the local, or points of social engagement that lend the legal 
process its access to the particularity of individual experience. Yet, even the 
expanding analytical appropriation of key human rights concepts, (as Kirsten 
Hastrup’s 2003 chapter on ‘the limits of legal language’ indicate), while achieving 
legally significant diagnostic particularities, always fall short of articulating the 
complexities of common experience (both the ‘everyday’ dimensions of human 
suffering and the commonality or collective experience of living in a social space or 
culture subject to such abuse: cf. Hastrup, 2003). Indeed, if we consider the linguistic 
phraseology of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereafter, UDHR, which 
was arguably not written in any specific legal terminology but is ‘ordinary’ indicative-
empirical and descriptive), we need to acknowledge that our seemingly self-evident 
notions of ‘human rights abuse’, which so dominates our understanding of the 
operational efficacy of human rights law, remains opens to broader (socio-cultural) 
registers of meaning, all which appeal to something like the ways being fully human 
are, or can, be prevented, yet could be enabled. It is perhaps for this purpose that 
the expansive political concepts of freedom and self-determination are so central to 
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the UDHR. For what is at stake in the UDHR is not simply a vulnerability to abuse or 
cruelty, but a suppression of ‘the human’ itself.  
 
Politically, ‘freedom’ is another such hugely complex concept, of course, and my 
view here is that artistic freedom is not something analytically separate from cultural 
rights more generally. For cultural rights, as a growing body of human rights 
application, (starting with Article 27 of the UDHR, and henceforth by virtue of human 
rights instruments defining ‘the cultural’ as a public, social and legal category), 
situates art as a category of the cultural and henceforth defines culture as intrinsic to 
public policy and a society’s working conception of the public realm, institutions, 
public opinion, and political participation. This is to say, understanding human rights 
in a cultural rights framework (in human rights discourse, it’s the other way around, 
of course) will afford us a fuller and more concrete understanding of what the socio-
cultural conditions of being a fully free human being are.  
 
This train of thought occurred to me vividly in the summer of 2018, when someone I 
had recently met at a British Council event was arrested in his home city of Dakar 
(Bangladesh) and interned for over 100 days on non-specific charges. Interestingly, 
Shahidal Alam was not arrested on account of his breaching the norms or legal limits 
of artistic freedom, but for voicing his indignation against government. Yet he was 
not a political actor: he was, truly, an artist, and an artist of some independence of 
mind. What occurred to me when I heard of his arrest, was that his exercise of 
artistic freedom was nonetheless central to his persistent voicing indignation against 
government. Alam, the artist, emerged as a major spokesperson for the oppressed 
of the world by using artistic freedom for a purpose: he developed his profound 
sense of mission, identification with, and a voice on behalf of, the poor and 
dispossessed in his country and around the world through his commitment to artistic 
freedom. In other words, artistic freedom was a means to an evolving political 
agency, as much as an individual artistic sensibility (or individual expression: 
arguably, they cannot be separated in Alam’s work).  
 
My second point then is that human rights law, in taking the individual as a 
fundamental point of reference (an historic achievement, of course), can nonetheless 
lead us to a misleading and exclusive conception of freedom and self-determination 
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in art and culture — in terms of individual artistic sensibility (what the artist 
unilaterally decides to do, or want to communicate, and so on). Shahidal Alam’s 
work, for me, exemplifies the trans-individual meaning of human rights — how 
freedom and self-determination in art opens onto a sense of political agency, of art 
demanding that we understand the broader socio-cultural conditions of our freedom 
or need for freedom. 
 
I want to underscore this point with reference to a recent work I was involved in, in 
the city of Coventry (where I work). The cultural campaign #HumansOfCov was 
launched by the City of Culture Trust in December of 2018 to mark the 70th 
anniversary of the UDHR. A panel of artists and cultural managers selected 30 
writers, poets and artists to create a piece of work about each individual Right, 
preferring artists whose proposal and medium maintained a specific sense of its 
subject being the city’s ‘public’ — whether the elderly, school children, refugees, or 
other identifiable constituency. It was a complex year-long project, and its several 
features provide me with two observations: (i) based on brief empirical research, the 
project began with a strong sense of the lack of public knowledge on human rights, 
particularly international law and its application. I was specifically interested in this, 
as a concurrent research project I was running similarly found that even cultural 
managers in the city had little explicit knowledge of human rights (the International 
Bill of Rights or international law per se). A reason for this was not necessarily an 
educational neglect, but that the established frameworks of the UK Human Rights 
Act of 1998 and the Equality Act 2010 – the central rights-based charters to govern 
UK domestic law and public policy — had effectively eclipsed international law in the 
public consciousness.  
 
And (ii) a primary aim of the #HumansOfCov project was to make the articles of the 
UDHR a topic of public conversation, something, quote, “everyday” [and for a 
comparable approach we may refer to the excellent work of the York Human Rights 
City project]. For Coventry, a city with a past history of community activism, an 
invigorating public discussion on human rights became a catalyst for recovering a 
social vision for change in relation to human fulfilment. I would even make the 
theoretical assertion that #HumansOfCov uncovered the original purpose of the 
UDHR: this purpose was not to diagnose, indict and prosecute, using a new legal 
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instrument; it was to articulate the fundamental socio-cultural conditions for human 
freedom and self-determination. It was a broad socio-cultural vision of an optimally 
functioning society. This great social vision has arguably been eclipsed, and eclipsed 
not principally by dictators or human rights abusers but by false conditions of human 
freedom and self-determination we all take for granted (the ‘freedoms’ of consumer 
prosperity offered by the advanced market economy, industrial infrastructure, global 
media technology and apparently unlimited vocational opportunities offered by 
prestigious higher education institutions).  
 
In this view, human rights has become a ‘high profile’ legal discourse not just 
because of its success in apprehending human rights abuse, but because of the ruse 
of individual freedom and self-determination as internal to our Western economies of 
surplus capital, individual prosperity and optimal functionality. (This is the ‘culture’ of 
individualism, requiring the atomisation of property rights and validation of individual 
self-interest over and against the common good: see Steven Miles’ Consumerism: as 
a way of life of 1998). The result is a heightened priority of the self-actualisation of 
the individual and a reduced understanding on how individuality itself is socially, 
historically constructed through socio-cultural conditions of common and public 
welfare, institutions, discourse and a consensus on ethics. We can be misled by how 
advanced capitalism has favourably played host to human rights discourse, 
indicating perhaps that there is something intrinsically rights-based about liberal 
market values. Rather, the socio-cultural terms of the UDHR requires no such 
advanced societal development: the least developing country, understanding this, 
could stand no less chance of developing a ‘human rights culture’ favourable to its 
otherwise poor populace and citizenry. We need therefore to discern the crucial lines 
of difference between the ‘individual’ of human rights and the individualism of our 
now vast globalised consumer culture (and understand how and why ‘artistic 
freedom’ in the way we define it in the West is not entirely intelligible in some 
cultures, nor perhaps desirable in others).     
 
There were many events during the ‘human rights year’ in Coventry, two of which 
were nationally significant. One was the travelling participatory project, The Empathy 
Museum (produced by London cultural producers, Artsadmin), which remained in the 
central Coventry city square. The Museum’s project in Coventry was ‘A Mile in My 
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Shoes’, where the ‘museum’ was presented as a shoe shop-like container in the city 
square, inviting visitors to don someone’s shoes and walk a mile (or enough 
distance) to listen with headphones to a life experience story, perhaps of a Syrian 
refugee living in the city, an elderly person who remembers the Second World War, 
and so on: each story was interconnected to one of the 30 UDHR articles. By 
implication, ‘empathy’ was presented as an essential component of this local public 
consciousness of human rights, and such a public or collective empathy began with 
narratives and testimonials of the lives of others. [cf. Schaffer and Smith (2004), on 
‘Life Narratives in the field of Human Rights’]. ‘A Mile in My Shoes’ made empathy 
both public, accessible, and socially compelling (at least, perhaps more than, say, a 
public lecture on human rights, or a documentary on human rights abuses or 
oppressive regimes — as critically important as these productions are).  
 
The second event I wish to refer to was the now-nationally publicised ‘Fly the Flag’ 
week (of 24-30 June), again marking the 70th anniversary of the UDHR. Dissident 
Chinese artist Ai Weiwei was commissioned by a London theatre production 
company (Fuel) to design and create a flag for human rights. The flag became a 
symbolic centre of celebratory events over the country, and went ‘viral’ and could 
soon be seen all over the world, to some extent indicating the power of human rights 
discourse in forming a global public sphere. In a statement in a promotional video on 
the project, WeiWei stated that “Human Rights is not a given property, but rather 
something we can only gain from our own defence and our own fight” [Quote from: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MaQemw1rCrI&feature=emb_logo. (accessed 
13/02/2020)]  
 
WeiWei’s flag design is a graphic interpretation of a human footprint, one of the most 
elemental imprints (in semiotic terms, an index) of a human being, originally drawn in 
cooperation with a Rohyinga refugee. For Weiwei, the foot was symbolic of basic 
existence, qualifying one for the ‘rights’ of a human. But herein lay an irony — is a 
footprint adequate as a symbolic statement on ‘the human’? As Italian Philosopher 
Georgio Agamben has it, modern society has conflated human living with the life of 
physical existence (and the material factors of welfare that sustain our biological life). 
Agamben’s concept of “bare life”, which he often relates to the state of destitution of 
a refugee, relates to how our conception of life (internal to our conception of ‘human’) 
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is insufficient and insufficiently informs our concept of ‘the human’, as is the world’s 
ever continuing attempt to deliver human rights to refugees in urgent need. We 
require, with Agamben, a conception of the human that is animated by the “lived” or 
the socio-cultural processes of being human (as a dynamic evolution towards our 
own self-determined fulfilment as human beings). [cf. Agamben’s Homo Sacer: 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life]. 
 
There’s no specific mention of “art” or artistic freedom in the UDHR or the two 1966 
covenants that make up the Bill of Rights. Although 13 of the 30 articles of the UDHR 
have been used by UNESCO in a range of contexts, explicitly in UNESCO’s 1980 
Recommendations on the Status of the Artist, the normative content on which it is 
still working (UNESCO, 1980).2 Their recent ‘global report’ entitled ‘Culture and 
Working Conditions for Artists’ (UNESCO, 2019) reminds us how UNESCO has 
maintained a significant historic relation with the UDHR and human rights practice 
[cf. the issues of The UNESCO Courir dedicated to human rights, from 1952, 1968 
and 2018; UNESCO’s Strategy on Human Rights, 2003; UNESCO Committee on 
Conventions and Recommendations, 2020 edition]. UNESCO’s emphasis, 
significantly, is not just on the immediate individual liberty of the artist (and their 
freedom to produce what they think or imagine to be appropriate or necessary); their 
emphasis is on the conditions of artistic production — a cultural policy framework in 
that it involves the relation between law, institutions and organisational fields. Artists 
are not cast as lone creators producing hermetic works of art that have a pure 
independent value; they work within a morally and legal complex economy of culture, 
shot through with what Foucault famously called ‘governmentality’ (or matrices of 
human power and interests organised to form systems of order and value). In this 
context, law itself is not to be understood simply as rule or regulation but as an 
embedded dynamic of meaning playing an orientating role in the evolving 
institutional systems and economic structures of society. Article 1 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights places “self-determination” as a fundamental 
feature of social life, and continues with the sentence “… By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.” This set of processes arguably cannot itself be prescribed by 
law, and even when it is read in terms of an evident, historical or empirical legal 
statement, it remains indelibly open-ended, appealing to a broader and as yet 
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defined socio-cultural depth of potential activity and agency. The Council of Europe, 
with a modicum of success, has established a ‘Cultural Parliament’, but broader 
forms of political representation remain open questions for artists the world over, as 
does their status in their economy (in relation to taxation, lack of unionisation, 
precarious working conditions, and so on).  
 
UK domestic law is not short of relevant strictures policing artistic freedom: [re: photo 
of a busking artist chalking messages of freedom on the pavement, taken by my 
student as we walked through Trafalgar Square in central London, January 2020]. 
Busking artists often write expressive text or images on a street pavement or city 
square, albeit in temporary medium such as chalk. On one occasion one of my 
students asked me if they were “allowed” to do that… or, would they be shunted on 
by the Police. I directed them to the UK’s local licensing for artists and musicians but 
then began to ponder the many legal restrictions already facing the street artist. 
Some ‘restrictions’ are traditional, like Obscenity laws; some are new and more 
diffuse, like Hate Speech or the many Terrorism offences.3 But authorities are not 
forthcoming in delineating common prohibitions from the fundamental human right 
when it comes to expression. Where are human rights protections within the 
domestic legal limits on cultural expression? There is no explicit guide to this, and 
artists tend to steer clear of these limits, generating a pervasive self-censorship by 
default.   
 
The NGO Freemuse, in their latest report on artistic freedom in Europe (published 
January 2020 and called ‘Security, Creativity, Tolerance and their Co-Existence’), 
points the finger even at the UK (Freemuse, 2020). Last month (January 2020) also 
saw the publication of a unique and timely ‘Freedom of Expression’ report by 
principle UK cultural sector magazine, Arts Professional. Its survey of artistic 
freedom revealed a huge rise in censorious attitudes on the part of cultural 
organisation management, stakeholders and national funders. This apparent decline 
in artistic freedom has provoked the setting up of a new ‘whistleblower’ website 
soliciting confidential reporting [see references], as a primary problem is the sector’s 
own self-censorship.  
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An explicit association of art with freedom was once thought to be European 
romanticism, and historically it often was. But this association remains a critical one 
and bound up in the legal limits of the internet and social media, and where 
advocacy organisations like PEN and Index on Censorship see their research on 
freedom of expression ever expanding. Yet, in the recent report of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on Cultural Rights — on the role of Human Rights Defenders – artists or 
cultural workers do not themselves play much of a role as agents of human rights 
(UNHRC, 2020); artists or cultural workers tend to remain vulnerable and potential 
victims, despite the vast range of arts and cultural institutions in the world that make 
up a global cultural economy of increasing prestige. Few cultural institutions — and 
few universities, scientific institutes or other powerful institutions of knowledge — 
engage consistently in actively defending human rights in the realm of arts and 
culture.  
 
The Special Rapporteur in Cultural Rights was established by the UNHRC in 2009, 
the first of whom was Pakistan feminist sociologist Farida Shaheed. In time, the 
subject of her routine reporting to the UNHRC moved to the subject of artistic 
freedom, exemplified by her major report of March 2013 ‘The Right to Freedom of 
Artistic Expression and Creativity’ (UNHRC, 2013). What is notable about this 
otherwise landmark report, is the ambiguity in defining cultural freedom in both legal 
and artistic terms; indeed, it is an historical irony that much of the most exciting and 
challenging works of art that populate our Western histories of art were (and often 
still are) created under conditions of restriction, repression and authoritarian 
government. As I indicated above, the “freedom” of art is not an ontological realm of 
unlimited or unfettered artistic will. It must be understood as intimately 
interconnected with ‘the human’, and human rights discourse allows us to form an 
articulate view on the socio-cultural conditions of the freedom required to activate 
‘the human’ in a way that is empowered enough to build an optimally functioning 
society.  
 
The implications of Shaheed’s report, is that artistic freedom is always a dynamic 
series of positions, discursive meanings, representations and expressions, 
indissolubly involved with the artist’s relation to publics, audiences, institutions, and 
society. And it is this direction of travel that Shaheed’s report takes me — that 
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human rights is not an absolute solution to complex problems of authority, power and 
culpability. It is not only the preside of expert lawyers, or takes the form of state or 
judicial patronage. Human rights is animated by a sublime purpose (as noted in the 
UDHR) — to define the conditions for the freedom and self-determination required 
for building the kind of society in which we can attain to a full realisation of ‘the 
human’. And it is a task perpetual, defined by philosopher Jean-François Lyotard in 
his collection of lectures and essays translated as The Inhuman (1988). The human, 
in the world we have constructed, of global market capitalism, is only ever in a 
process or recovery and re-discovery; it is never simply transparent or available or 
enforceable by law. In the words of Ai Weiwei, it is “..something we can only gain 
from our own defence and our own fight”.    
 
Referring back to my examples, then, and in direct response to the subject of this 
conference: artists can play a role in the protection of fundamental rights by (i) public 
education and cultivating a public and intellectual comprehension of the meaning 
and function of human rights; and (ii) creating everyday experiences that pertain to 
human rights (such as empathy). In tandem with this, academics, researchers and 
intellectuals need to work with artists and cultural producers in (a) identifying the 
human rights protections and ‘red lines’ within the increasing complexity and 
enforcement of domestic laws, and defending cultural freedom along those lines; and 
(b) inspiring a militant internationalism, whereby domestic law is never allowed to 
eclipse or make international legal conventions a matter of domestic 
governmentality. The UDHR is exemplary in that it was able to evolve into a legal 
document but was itself a profound declaration on the socio-cultural conditions of 
human fulfilment.   
     
Notes 
1: The main legal instruments for human rights in the cultural realm are usually cited 
as follows: 
The Constitution of UNESCO (1945) 
The International Bill of Human Rights (UDHR/ICESCR/ICCPR). 
UNESCO Protection of Human Rights: Procedure 104 (1978) 
Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (UNESCO, 2001) 
The Fribourg Declaration (UN, 2007) 
UN Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 
(UNESCO 2005) 
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[cf. also Intellectual Property Rights, starting with The Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works, 1889, currently operating within the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
(WCT) of 1996 and a patchwork of other bilateral and international trade agreements]. 
 
The Fribourg Declaration (UN, 2007) began a UNESCO sponsored research project, to 
determine the full spectrum of human rights law pertaining to arts and culture. Its resulting 
Declaration determined the full scope of culture as a human right, and can be listed as 
follows: 
(a) human creativity in all its diversity and the conditions for it to be exercised, developed 
and made accessible;  
(b) the free choice, expression and development of identities, which include the right to 
choose not to be a part of particular collectives, and the right to exit a collective, and to take 
part on an equal basis in the process of defining it;  
(c) the rights of individuals and groups to participate, or not to participate, in the cultural life 
of their choice, and to conduct their own cultural practices;  
(d) the right to interact and exchange, regardless of group affiliation and of frontiers;  
(e) the rights to enjoy and have access to the arts, to knowledge, including scientific 
knowledge, and to an individual’s own cultural heritage, and that of others; and  
(f) the rights to participate in the interpretation, elaboration and development of cultural 
heritage and in the reformulation of cultural identities (A/HRC/40/53, para. 15). 
 
2: See also one of the sources of this document, UNESCO’s ‘Recommendation on 
Participation by the People at Large in Cultural Life and their Contribution to It’ (November 
1976).  
 
3: ‘Hate’ is a legal category fraught with political ambiguities; there is no one ‘hate’ bill of law, 
and hate speech is a distinct legal category from hate acts. Other pan-European categories 
of law are as follows [this list is not exhaustive]: 
Obscenity (e.g. pornography) (all countries, less EU) 
Copyright/IP – national and international (all countries) 
Libel, Defamation and Slander (all countries) 
Offending the State (e.g. Turkey and many others) 
Blasphemy (many Islamic countries; traditional Christian) 
Offending the Church (e.g. Greece) 
Confidential information (e.g. state security; military: all) 
Theft or appropriation (e.g. Nazi confiscated art; inconsistent) 
Hate speech (EU; USA) 
Terrorism offenses (e.g. glorifying terror; most) 
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Appendix 
 
THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS AS RELEVANT specificity of the artist and 
artistic production, with reference to the relevant UNESCO recommendations and the 
2005 Convention on cultural diversity. 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966)  
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966) 
Recommendation on Participation by the People at Large in Cultural Life and their 
Contribution to It (1976) 
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Recommendation concerning the Status of the Artist (1980) 
The UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions (2005) 
 
 
UNDHR (1948) 
 
ICCPR (1966) ICESCR (1966) Observations with 
reference to the UNESCO 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
(1976 & 1980)  
 
Article 1:  
“All human beings are 
born free and equal in 
dignity and rights. They 
are endowed with reason 
and conscience and 
should act towards one 
another in a spirit of 
brotherhood.” 
Article 2:  
“Everyone is entitled to all 
the rights and freedoms 
set forth in this 
Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind…. ” 
Article 1:  
(i): “All peoples have the 
right of self-
determination. By virtue 
of that right they freely 
determine their political 
status and freely pursue 
their economic, social 
and cultural 
development. 
Article 6: 
(i): “Every human being 
has the inherent right to 
life. This right shall be 
protected by law. No one 
shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his life. 
Article 1: 
(i): All peoples have the 
right of self-
determination. By virtue 
of that right they freely 
determine their political 
status and freely 
pursue their economic, 
social and cultural 
development. 
Article 2: 
(i): Each State Party to 
the present Covenant 
undertakes to take 
steps, individually and 
through international 
assistance and co-
operation, especially 
economic and 
technical, to the 
maximum of its 
available resources, 
with a view to achieving 
progressively the full 
realization of the rights 
recognized in the 
present Covenant by all 
appropriate means, 
including particularly 
the adoption of 
legislative measures. 
Article 27 
In those States in which 
ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities 
exist, persons 
belonging to such 
minorities shall not be 
denied the right, in 
community with the 
other members of their 
group, to enjoy their 
own culture, to profess 
and practise their own 
religion, or to use their 
own language. 
 
Art as an expression of freedom, 
requires recognition as such (and not to 
be confused with other freedoms or 
marginalised as a non-substantive form 
of social life). 
Artistic self-determination has aesthetic 
and economic dimensions, and these 
cannot be completely disassociated in 
policy. 
Artists may assume a political status as 
artists, not simply as citizens.  
The making of a particular form of art or 
a particular work of art should not 
attract a totalising condemnation, as it 
remains part of a cultural development 
(and is never an absolute statement or 
can assumed to ‘represent’ the person 
of the artist in toto). An artist can never 
be assumed to be equivalent or entirely 
responsible for the content of their art. 
Artistic and the expression and 
production of meaning, is universally 
significant, and must be accessible to 
all – this is the basis for (artistic) 
community and the right to community 
for artists.  
To be an artist is a form of cultural 
identity, but does not supplant or is 
necessarily prior to other identities the 
artist may hold or pertain to. An artist 
cannot be assumed to be equivalent to 
an artistic community, group or any 
association to which they belong or are 
associated with.  
Article 3: 
“Everyone has the right to 
life, liberty and the 
security of person.” 
Article 22 
“Everyone, as a member 
of society, has the right to 
social security and is 
entitled to realization, 
through national effort 
and international co-
operation and in 
accordance with the 
organization and 
Article 9: 
(i): “Everyone has the 
right to liberty and 
security of person. No 
one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or 
detention. No one shall 
be deprived of his liberty 
except on such grounds 
and in accordance with 
such procedure as are 
established by law. 
Article 22 
Article 6 
(i): The States Parties 
to the present 
Covenant recognize the 
right to work, which 
includes the right of 
everyone to the 
opportunity to gain his 
living by work which he 
freely chooses or 
accepts, and will take 
appropriate steps to 
safeguard this right. 
Article 8 
Insofar as the subject of art is 
fundamental human perception, 
sensation and feeling, visual 
communication and expression, it is 
internal to human liberty.  
Art is a vocation – no one can demand 
one to be an artist, or demand an artist 
cease from being an artist.  
Art is labour, employment, commerce, 
trade, a profession, and requires the 
same social (welfare, e.g.) or economic 
(taxation, e.g.) conditions of support as 
any citizen engaged in labour.  
If labour markets do not exist for artists, 
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resources of each State, 
of the economic, social 
and cultural rights 
indispensable for his 
dignity and the free 
development of his 
personality. 
Article 23 
(i): Everyone has the right 
to work, to free choice of 
employment, to just and 
favourable conditions of 
work and to protection 
against unemployment. 
(ii): Everyone, without 
any discrimination, has 
the right to equal pay for 
equal work. 
(iii): Everyone who works 
has the right to just and 
favourable remuneration 
ensuring for himself and 
his family an existence 
worthy of human dignity, 
and supplemented, if 
necessary, by other 
means of social 
protection. 
(iv): Everyone has the 
right to form and to join 
trade unions for the 
protection of his interests. 
Article 24  
Everyone has the right to 
rest and leisure, including 
reasonable limitation of 
working hours and 
periodic holidays with 
pay.  
Article 25  
(i): Everyone has the right 
to a standard of living 
adequate for the health 
and well-being of himself 
and of his family, 
including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care 
and necessary social 
services, and the right to 
security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, 
disability, widowhood, old 
age or other lack of 
livelihood in 
circumstances beyond 
his control.  
interests. 
 
 
(i): Everyone shall have 
the right to freedom of 
association with others, 
including the right to 
form and join trade 
unions for the protection 
of his interests. 
(i): “The right of 
everyone to form trade 
unions and join the 
trade union of his 
choice, subject only to 
the rules of the 
organization 
concerned, for the 
promotion and 
protection of his 
economic and social 
interests. No 
restrictions may be 
placed on the exercise 
of this right other than 
those prescribed by law 
and which are 
necessary in a 
democratic society in 
the interests of national 
security or public order 
or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms 
of others. 
they should be created. 
Artists can defend their interests 
through collective unionisation and legal 
activity.  
Artists require a framework of social 
security. 
Artists should not be arrested, detained 
or accused of criminality on the basis of 
laws whose subject is not art or where 
the legal infringement pertains to 
behaviour not identified as artistic. 
 
Article 6 
“Everyone has the right to 
recognition everywhere 
as a person before the 
law. 
Article 7 
“All are equal before the 
law and are entitled 
without any discrimination 
to equal protection of the 
law. All are entitled to 
equal protection against 
any discrimination in 
violation of this 
Declaration and against 
Article 16 
“Everyone shall have the 
right to recognition 
everywhere as a person 
before the law. 
Article 17(i): 
“No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary or 
unlawful interference 
with his privacy, family, 
home or 
correspondence, nor to 
unlawful attacks on his 
honour and reputation. 
 Artists have a right to identity, to be 
represented as artists before the law. 
Artists should not be subject to 
assumptions or stereotypical 
associations of art or artists as typifying 
a set of behaviours. Identity is not a set 
of behavioural traits. 
The artist is a citizen – as an artist; their 
art should not be discriminated against 
on the basis of either non-artistic 
categories of taste or preference, social 
or political desirability.  Artists should be 
able to claim protection from 
interventions by non-artists in their work 
and public representation.  
As interpretation is internal to art, the 
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any incitement to such 
discrimination. 
Article 12 
“No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary 
interference with his 
privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to 
attacks upon his honour 
and reputation. Everyone 
has the right to the 
protection of the law 
against such interference 
or attacks. 
 
artist should not to be persecuted for 
their expressions, ideas, 
communications (whether based on 
assumptions or individual assertions on 
what these are, or on ‘expert’ artistic 
judgements).    
Article 18 
“Everyone has the right to 
freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion; 
this right includes 
freedom to change his 
religion or belief, and 
freedom, either alone or 
in community with others 
and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or 
belief in teaching, 
practice, worship and 
observance. 
Article 19 
“Everyone has the right to 
freedom of opinion and 
expression; this right 
includes freedom to hold 
opinions without 
interference and to seek, 
receive and impart 
information and ideas 
through any media and 
regardless of frontiers. 
 
Article 18 
(i): “Everyone shall have 
the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and 
religion. This right shall 
include freedom to have 
or to adopt a religion or 
belief of his choice, and 
freedom, either 
individually or in 
community with others 
and in public or private, 
to manifest his religion 
or belief in worship, 
observance, practice 
and teaching. 
(ii): No one shall be 
subject to coercion 
which would impair his 
freedom to have or to 
adopt a religion or belief 
of his choice. 
Article 19 
(i): “Everyone shall have 
the right to hold opinions 
without interference. 
(ii): Everyone shall have 
the right to freedom of 
expression; this right 
shall include freedom to 
seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of 
all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in 
writing or in print, in the 
form of art, or through 
any other media of his 
choice. 
 Artists have the freedom for dissent, 
opposition, new ideas, resistance to 
tradition custom and cultural authority; 
and provocation. Artists can influence, 
instigate or contribute to changes in 
belief, values and frameworks of 
thought. 
Artists cannot be assumed to hold one 
permanent set of values, or represent 
one fixed ideology, and become a 
target of disapprobation on that basis.  
Artists should not be influenced or 
manipulated into conforming to social or 
political (non-artistic) expectation.  
The views, opinions and arguments of 
artists should be attributed with the 
credibility of other professionals in the 
public realm. 
Artists should be able to operate as 
conduits and agents of information and 
knowledge. 
Artists should not be defined or 
identified with a specific medium if it is 
to the detriment of their freedom. 
Artists should not be categorised for 
eligibility in employment or professional 
recognition based primarily on any 
association with a specific artistic 
medium. 
Article 27 
1. “Everyone has the right 
freely to participate in the 
cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the 
arts and to share in 
scientific advancement 
and its benefits. 
2. Everyone has the right 
to the protection of the 
moral and material 
interests resulting from 
any scientific, literary or 
artistic production of 
which he is the author. 
Article 29 
1. Everyone has duties to 
the community in which 
alone the free and full 
development of his 
personality is possible. 
 
-- 
Article 15 
(i): The States Parties 
to the present 
Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone: 
(a) To take part in 
cultural life; 
(b) To enjoy the 
benefits of scientific 
progress and its 
applications; 
(c) To benefit from the 
protection of the moral 
and material interests 
resulting from any 
scientific, literary or 
artistic production of 
which he is the author. 
(ii): The steps to be 
taken by the States 
Parties to the present 
Covenant to achieve 
Artists work in the context of a public 
and audiences with rights to all art and 
culture. 
Artists have rights of participation in 
culture — as artists, and without 
restrictions based on their art, expertise 
or perceived competency. 
As the response, interpretations and 
perceptions of the viewer is internal to 
art, the artists cannot be ranked or 
subject to categorisations of expertise 
or competency as other professionals. 
Artists should benefit tangibly (not just 
intangibly) from the advancements of 
art in general (e.g. institutional facilities 
or resources; market value, etc.). 
Education and science are realms of 
knowledge acquisition cognate to art, 
and policy frameworks should allow for 
them to engage with the arts in mutual 
benefit.  
Artists can claim copyright to their work 
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2. In the exercise of his 
rights and freedoms, 
everyone shall be subject 
only to such limitations as 
are determined by law 
solely for the purpose of 
securing due recognition 
and respect for the rights 
and freedoms of others 
and of meeting the just 
requirements of morality, 
public order and the 
general welfare in a 
democratic society. 
3. These rights and 
freedoms may in no case 
be exercised contrary to 
the purposes and 
principles of the United 
Nations. 
 
 
the full realization of 
this right shall include 
those necessary for the 
conservation, the 
development and the 
diffusion of science and 
culture.  
(iii): The States Parties 
to the present 
Covenant undertake to 
respect the freedom 
indispensable for 
scientific research and 
creative activity. 
(iv): The States Parties 
to the present 
Covenant recognize the 
benefits to be derived 
from the 
encouragement and 
development of 
international contacts 
and co-operation in the 
scientific and cultural 
fields. 
along with other protections on their 
ideas, identifications and inventions 
[see also Article 17: right to property] 
As a realm of knowledge, art should 
also be recognised as a form of 
research.  
Artists should be mobile and able to 
conduct artistic research and progress 
artistic advancement through mobility, 
local, regional and international. 
Article 28  
“Everyone is entitled to a 
social and international 
order in which the rights 
and freedoms set forth in 
this Declaration can be 
fully realized.   
 
-- 
 Artists, for their rights to be fulfilled, 
may require international mobility for 
solidarity and support.  
Artists should  
 
 
 
 
………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
